Space is no longer the exclusive realm of two Cold War adversaries chasing prestige. In recent decades, it has transformed into a contested, commercially viable, and increasingly congested domain. What began as a theatre of ideological one-upmanship has evolved into a globally significant economic and strategic frontier, where launch vehicles share orbit with surveillance satellites, communication payloads, and leftover debris from past missions.
India, having carved out a reputation as a frugal yet formidable space power, finds itself at a crucial juncture: it must now navigate not only the technological challenges of exploration, but also the political and legal voids that define outer space governance. The stakes are rising, and so is the cost of regulatory inertia.
A Multilateral Legacy, Facing Unilateral Disruption
The foundational framework of international space law was shaped in an era of limited access. The Outer Space Treaty (1967), adopted at the height of Cold War diplomacy, set out guiding principles: the non-appropriation of celestial bodies, the peaceful use of space, and the common interest of all humankind. But these principles-while noble-were forged before commercial actors existed, before satellite mega-constellations became feasible, and certainly before asteroid mining entered mainstream discourse.
India was not at the negotiating table when these treaties were formulated, nor were most Global South nations. Today, however, their presence in space is substantive, and their interests in shaping new norms are legitimate. The regulatory lag-between what is codified and what is practiced-is not just inconvenient; it is dangerous.
India’s Strategic and Normative Commitments
India’s space programme, led by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), has historically emphasised civilian applications: weather monitoring, disaster management, education, and rural connectivity. The emphasis was not accidental; it reflected a broader worldview-that technology should serve societal development, not strategic confrontation.
Yet this developmental focus does not imply naïveté. With the successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2019 (Mission Shakti), India demonstrated its awareness of space’s evolving security dimension. Importantly, it also chose to frame the test within the logic of deterrence, not escalation. The debris was minimised; the messaging was restrained.
India’s broader diplomatic position-echoed at forums such as UNCOPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament – emphasises three key concerns:
- That outer space must not become a theatre for armed competition;
- That space must be governed by inclusive, consensus-driven mechanisms;
- And that rules should reflect technological parity, not privilege.
Three Regulatory Fault Lines India Cannot Ignore
1. Commercial Resource Extraction Without Oversight
When the Artemis Accords were introduced by the United States in 2020, they were framed as a voluntary mechanism for responsible lunar exploration. However, by granting signatory states the ability to “extract and utilise” resources on celestial bodies, they have raised difficult questions: Can a state-or its corporate proxies-claim operational zones on the Moon? Do such provisions violate the OST’s non-appropriation clause?
India has wisely withheld endorsement, noting that bilateral or club-based arrangements risk sidelining the multilateral consensus. Instead, India has advocated for resource governance to be debated under UN supervision, with enforceable safeguards and benefit-sharing mechanisms-especially for states with emerging space capabilities.
2. Space Traffic and the Chaos of Low Earth Orbit
With over 10,000 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned, orbital congestion is no longer a hypothetical concern. Collisions, radio frequency interference, and space debris have become tangible threats-not only to national assets, but to global connectivity.
While India has begun developing its own Space Situational Awareness (SSA) systems, including the NETRA project, the absence of a global framework is a limiting factor. India’s interest lies in establishing:
- A real-time, open-access STM (Space Traffic Management) system;
- Binding obligations for de-orbiting defunct satellites;
- And strict penalties for negligent behaviour in orbital deployment.
Without such norms, a few reckless actors-state or private-could render entire orbits unusable for generations.
3. The Weaponisation Dilemma
India has consistently supported the peaceful use of space. However, the geopolitical environment is shifting. ASAT tests by China (2007), the United States (2008), and Russia (2021) have introduced strategic ambiguity into what was once considered a demilitarised domain.
India’s position-articulated both after Mission Shakti and at the G20 Space Economy Leaders Meeting (2023)-is that any future legal framework must:
- Prohibit placement of all weapons (not just WMDs) in orbit;
- Encourage pre-launch notifications for dual-use missions;
- And promote transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) among major spacefaring nations.
India recognises the fine balance between credible deterrence and cooperative restraint-and advocates for a space security doctrine that institutionalises both.
Domestic Readiness and the Role of the Private Sector
India’s internal regulatory environment is undergoing overdue reform. The Indian Space Policy 2023, approved by the Cabinet, opens the sector to private firms and lays the groundwork for a new legal ecosystem-covering liability, licensing, and revenue-sharing models. The creation of IN-SPACe as a single-window agency for private participation signals a shift from state monopoly to strategic liberalisation.
However, India must also ensure that domestic regulation aligns with its international posturing. Allowing private actors without clear ethical or environmental mandates risks undermining India’s credibility in global forums.
Moreover, as Indian firms begin to explore satellite internet, launch services, and even planetary missions, a national space legislation-currently in draft-is urgently required. The law must codify liability, clarify ownership of data and materials, and delineate state responsibility in cases of damage or misconduct.
A Role for India in Norm Entrepreneurship
Historically, norm-setting has been the prerogative of technologically advanced Western states. But India’s track record-whether in climate negotiations, WTO reform, or global digital governance-suggests it is capable of shaping norms rather than merely adapting to them.
In space diplomacy, India could:
- Lead a coalition of Global South states to push for equitable access to orbital and frequency resources;
- Partner with middle powers like France, Japan, and South Korea to develop ethical guidelines for AI usage in autonomous space missions;
- Propose a UN Special Rapporteur on Space Governance, tasked with mediating between existing treaties and emergent practices.
India’s voice is increasingly viewed not as a balancing force between East and West, but as an autonomous actor capable of producing original thought.
Conclusion: A New Multilateral Compact for the Cosmos
Outer space is rapidly becoming what the oceans once were: a global commons under siege by unilateral ambition and technological asymmetry. If unregulated, this frontier could descend into a domain of competition, exclusion, and irreversible environmental damage.
India-by virtue of its scientific capacity, normative clarity, and geopolitical credibility-is well-placed to lead efforts toward a new multilateral compact. This would not only safeguard its own interests, but also affirm its commitment to a rules-based order-one that is equitable, sustainable, and inclusive.
The world does not need another hegemon in space. It needs an architect. India may be one of the few countries positioned-technically, politically, and morally-to take on that role.
